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IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF FITNESS FOR HABITATION IN SALE OF
RESIDENTIAL DWELLINGS
O NE of the oldest doctrines in the field of law is the rule of caveat
emptor in real estate sales. Under this doctrine there are no im-
plied warranties either of title or quality.' However, in recent years
this doctrine has come under attack. The purpose of this note is to
examine the reasons for the doctrine of caveat emptor, discuss its
status today, and discuss some of the problems that arise when the
doctrine is abandoned in the sale of homes.
I. REASONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
Several reasons have been advanced in support of the doctrine.
First, it has been stated that the vendor and purchaser are dealing at
arm's length; therefore, the purchaser has the opportunity to inspect
and require an express warranty if he so desires.' Second, it has been
said that there could be no certainty or stability in the real estate field
if caveat emptor did not apply.' The third reason given is that a deed
made in full execution of a contract of sale merges the terms of the
contract therein, thereby cutting off any liability of the seller.'
The first reason has been criticized on the ground that it simply
does not recognize the realities of the situation. Most defects that
would be covered under an implied warranty would be latent and
hence not discoverable upon inspection, even assuming that the pur-
chaser had the ability to make a proper inspection. With the advent
of the mass-production home builder, it is highly unlikely that a
purchaser could convince such a builder to give him an express war-
ranty because of the superior bargaining power of the builder-vendor
in this situation.
The second reason, upon close analysis, is no reason at all be-
1 7 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926, at 797 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963); Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in Sales of Realty -Recent Assaults on the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541,
542 (1962) ; 51 ILL. B.J. 498, 499 (1963).
2 Hill Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pallottine Fathers House of Studies, Inc., 220 Md. 526,
154 A.2d 821, 825 (1959) ; Fegas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223, 227
(1958) ; see Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [19311 All E.R. 93 (K.B.).
3
Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717, 719 (1957),
wherein it is stated that "an element of uncertainty would pervade the entire real
estate field. Real estate transactions would become chaotic if vendors were subjected
to liability after they had parted with ownership and control of the premises."
4 Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963).
5 Bearman, supra note 1, at 545; see Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of
Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633, 651 (1965).
6
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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cause exemption from liability should not be granted merely because
the extent of the liability will cause uncertainty. Chaos has not re-
sulted in the field of chattel sales,' although implied warranties are
in effect in nearly all states with respect to such sales.8
The fallacy of the third reason was recognized by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Glisan v. Smolenske' where the court held that the
delivery of the deed constitutes only part performance of the sales
contract, and other matters, including implied warranties, remain
obligatory.
II. EROSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
The first exception to the caveat emptor rule was made by dic-
tum in an English case, Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd."0 In that
case the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant for
the purchase of a lot and house that was under construction at the
time of the agreement. After completion of the house, the plaintiff
occupied it but was forced to leave under medical advice because a
serious dampness penetrated the house. The court found an express
warranty under which it held the defendant liable. However, the
court went on to say, by dictum, that when one is purchasing a house
that is completed at the time of the sale there is no implied warranty
of fitness for habitation, since the purchaser has ample opportunity
to inspect the house and discover any defects that may be present,
and if the purchaser wants a warranty, he may obtain an express one."
But, the court said the case is quite different when one contracts to
purchase a house that is in the process of construction at the time of
the agreement, since it is clear that the purchaser is buying the house
to live in and has no opportunity to inspect; therefore, there should
be an implied warranty that the house will be fit for habitation. 2
The dictum in the Miller case, that there is an implied warranty
when the house is purchased in the process of construction, has be-
come the rule in England"3 and in some jurisdictions in the United
States."4 However, most jurisdictions still cling to the traditional
7 Id., 207 A.2d at 326.
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 315.
9153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
10 [1931] All E.R. 93 (K.B.).
1 Id. at 96.
12 Ibid.
13 Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.): The court had trouble
with the reasoning found in the Miller case but applied the rule to a substantially
completed house. Jennings v. Tavener, [1955] 2 All E.R. 769 (Q.B.).
14 Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A:M Sunrise
Constr. Co., 36 Iii. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 ( 1962 ); JoSe-Balz Co. v. DeWitt,
93 Ind. App. 672, 176 N.E. 864 (1931); Minemount Realty Co. v. Ballentine, 111
N.J. Eq. 398, 162 Atl. 594 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103
Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla.
1963) ; Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
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rule of no implied warranties in the sale of real property."5 The only
statutory authority on the point is in Louisiana, which has adopted
the doctrine of redhibition, in effect establishing an implied war-
ranty in the sale of real property as well as chattels. 6
This distinction between finished and unfinished houses is un-
sound. The fundamental principle underlying the doctrine of im-
plied warranty is reliance. The home buyer,
is admittedly unskilled in the mysteries of house construction and
must therefore rely heavily upon the superior skill and training of
his builder-vendor. Inspection will be of little use ... in protecting
the vendee, both because of the expense and because the defects are
usually hidden. Though the vendor-vendee relationship may not be
technically a fiduciary one, the trust placed in the vendor coupled
with the relative helplessness of the vendee make it one. 7
Therefore it follows that if the purchaser is relying upon his vendor's
skill it makes little sense to distinguish between finished and un-
finished houses.
The unreasonableness of this situation was first recognized in
the Colorado case of Carpenter v. Donohoe'8 where the court ex-
tended the doctrine of implied warranty to a completed house. In
that case plaintiffs brought suit against their builder-vendor for dam-
ages suffered when the completed house they purchased from the
builder-vendor developed severe cracks in the foundation, making
the house unsafe for occupancy. After discussing the cases applying
the implied warranty doctrine to unfinished houses, the court went on
to say:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house
which is near completion than would apply to one who purchases
a new house seems incongruous. To say that the former may rely
15E.g., Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961) ; Allen v.
Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 237 P.2d 818 (1951); Walton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App. 753,
131 S.E.2d 655 (1963) ; Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Il. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780
(1963) (which distinguished lWeck, supra note 14) ; Tudor v. Heugal, 132 Ind.
App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961) (which did not mention Jose-Balz Co. v. DeVitt,
supra note 14) ; Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup.
Ct, 1965) ; Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
16 LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 2520-48 (1952).
17 Bearman, supra note 1, at 574. The argument of reliance was first raised by Waesche,
J., dissenting in Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 296, 134 A.2d
717, 720 (1957), af'd on other grounds, 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958). Judge
Waesche stated:
Since the defendant was in the business of erecting houses to sell, it repre-
sented that it possessed a reasonable amount of skill necessary for erection of
a house. This representation was impliedly made to whomever purchased from
the defendant a house erected by it for the purpose of selling. Such a repre-
sentation is indispensable to effectuate the sale of a house erected by a devel-
oper for the purpose of selling. Otherwise there would be no sales. A person in
the business of building houses to sell is fully aware that a purchaser relies
upon such an implied representation. Since the defendant impliedly represented
that it possessed a reasonable amount of skill requisite for the erection of a
house, it follows that it also impliedly represented that the house was erected
in a proper and reasonably workmanlike manner.
18 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
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on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is a distinction with-
out a reasonable basis ....
We hold that the implied warranty doctrine is extended to in-
clude agreements between builder-vendors and purchasers for the
sale of newly constructed buildings, completed at the time of con-
tracting. There is an implied warranty that builder-vendors have
complied with the building code of the area in which the structure
is located. Where, as here, a home is the subject of sale, there are
implied warranties that the home was built in workmanlike manner
and is suitable for habitation. 19
New Jersey has followed Colorado in the case of Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc.2" In that case the defendant builder-vendor, a
well-known mass developer of homes specializing in planned com-
munities, contracted with the purchaser prior to completion. In 1958
the purchaser moved in and occupied the house until 1960 when he
leased it to the plaintiff. The sixteen-month-old son of the plaintiff
was injured by hot water from the bathroom faucet. The cause of the
injury was alleged to have been the failure of the builder-vendor to
include in the hot water system a mixing valve to prevent excessively
hot water from flowing from the faucets. The plaintiff brought suit
on breach of warranty and negligence. The court found that the de-
fendant was negligent, and in addition, found the defendant liable
either on the basis of breach of an implied warranty or on strict liabil-
ity, considering both remedies equally applicable.2 The fact that the
contract was entered into prior to completion of construction was not
considered significant by the court; the court was primarily concerned
with imposing an implied warranty in the sale of new houses. Al-
though the suit here was for bodily injury, the court will certainly
include economic injury within the protection of the warranty. In
discussing implied warranty the court states:
When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised
model . . . he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its
implied representation that the house will be erected in reasonably
workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation. He
has no architect or other professional advisor of his own, he has no
real competency to inspect on his own, his actual examination is, in
the nature of things, largely superficial, and his opportunity for ob-
taining meaningful protective changes in the conveyancing docu-
ments prepared by the builder-vendor is negligible. If there is im-
proper construction such as a defective heating system or a defective
ceiling, stairway and the like, the well-being of the vendee and
others is seriously endangered and serious injury is forseeable. The
public interest dictates that if such injury does result from the de-
fective construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible de-
veloper who created the danger and who is in the better economic
19 Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
-044 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
21 Id., 207 A.2d at 325.
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position to bear the loss rather than by the injured party who justi-
fiably relied on the developer's skill and implied representation.
22
It can be seen, therefore, that the underlying reason for the ap-
plication of implied warranties to the sale of houses is the reliance
of the purchaser upon the builder-vendor's skill and knowledge that
the house was constructed properly. As was pointed out by the court
in the Schipper case, the purchaser has no recourse but to rely. There-
fore, if the trust which the purchaser has placed in the builder-vendor
is abused by him when he builds a house with defects, it would be
manifestly unjust to absolve the builder-vendor of liability.
III. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE APPLICATION OF
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
By extending the doctrine of implied warranty several problems
are created. The first problem concerns the nature of the seller.
Should a person who is not engaged in the business of selling real
estate be bound under a theory of implied warranty? It will be re-
called that in both Carpenter and Schipper the sellers were builder-
vendors. It has been argued that the doctrine should be extended to
a seller who is merely a private owner selling his residence on the
ground that the question ultimately becomes one of whether or not
the purchaser has received what he has bargained for. Considered
in this light it makes no difference whether the seller is a professional
or an amateur.24 However, this argument fails to consider that the
basic principle underlying the doctrine of implied warranty is the
reliance of the purchaser upon the seller.2" In the case of the ama-
teur seller there should be very little reliance upon him because he
has no expert knowledge or skill. Both the seller and purchaser
stand on equal footing. Neither party is in any better economic posi-
tion to bear the risk of loss, as is the case with a builder-vendor. If
the seller misrepresents the property the purchaser may bring an
action for fraud or misrepresentation. It appears, therefore, that
liability should be limited under the doctrine to builder-vendors.
This conclusion is in accord with the application of implied war-
ranties to chattels.
26
A closely related problem to that discussed above is whether the
doctrine should be limited to sales of new property only, or whether
it shaould be extended to include sales of used property. In both
Carpenter and Schipper the homes were new. Since it was concluded
22 Id., 207 A.2d at 325-26.
23 Haskell, supra note 5, at 649.
24 Ibid.
25 Authorities cited note 17 supra.
2 6
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1).
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above that the doctrine should apply to builder-vendors only, extend-
ing the doctrine to used property will have little effect because most
used property is sold by private owners. In a case decided after Car-
penter, the Colorado Supreme Court expressly refused to extend the
doctrine to used houses.2" However, where the seller of the used
property has actual knowledge of any defects, it would not be un-
reasonable to require him to warrant that there are no defects to the
best of his knowledge other than the ones he has disclosed.
It is suggested that there should exist an implied warranty run-
ning against the builder even though the house has been sold if, had
the house not been sold, the original purchaser would have had a
cause of action. This suggestion is based upon the belief that the
builder-vendor should not be relieved of his liability merely because
his purchaser has sold the house. Also, the element of reliance is
present since the second purchaser is influenced by the fact that the
house is relatively new and therefore relies upon the builder for the
assurance that the house is suitable for habitation.
The next problem involves the relationship of the parties.
Should there be privity of contract between the person suffering the
injury and the one who is held liable for the injury? In Carpenter
there was privity; however, it will be recalled that in Schipper there
was no privity. In that case the court stated:
[I]t seems hardly conceivable that a court recognizing the modern
need for a vendee occupant's right to recover on principles of im-
plied warranty or strict liability would revivify the requirement of
privity, which is fast disappearing in the comparable product liabil-
ity field, to preclude a similar right in other occupants likely to be
injured by the builder vendor's default.2
It may be argued that the doctrine of privity should be retained be-
cause if it is not, the vendor will be subjected to liability for a never-
ending period. However, this problem can be eliminated by the
establishment of a statute of limitations. The setting of a time limit
within which an action must be brought presents a difficult problem.
The Louisiana Civil Code has a one-year statute of limitations, be-
ginning with the date of the sale, on all actions of implied warranty,
both real and personal property. 9 The Uniform Commercial Code
has a four-year statute of limitation for actions based upon breach of
implied warranty."0 A suggestion has been made that the statutory
period should be one year, beginning at the time the deed is delivered
or the vendee takes possession, whichever occurs first, on the ground
2 H.B. Bolas Enterprises, Inc. v. Zarlengo, 400 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1965).
28 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 328 (1965).
29 LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 2534, 2546 (1952).
3 0
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725.
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that one year represents a full seasonal cycle which should bring out
any defects existing at the time of the sale. Defects which appear
later are more likely to be due to ordinary wear and tear."
The question ultimately resolves itself into a policy decision in
which conflicting interests must be balanced. The period must not
be unduly long because it would place an intolerable burden upon
the builder-vendor and could likely lead to chaos in the field. How-
ever, the period must be of sufficient length to enable the purchaser
to discover the defects within the time allowed. A possible solution
would be to have varying statutes of limitation for different defects.
For example, a longer period could be established for a defect arising
from the failure to meet building code requirements, such as the
failure to construct a proper foundation, than for a defect which
arises from an unforeseen circumstance, such as water seeping into a
basement due to a rising water table. The decision is legislative in
nature and should be made by the legislature rather than by the
judiciary.
Another difficult problem raised is the establishment of the
standard to be used to determine if the warranty has been breached.
In the Schipper case the court said, "in determining whether the house
was defective, the test admittedly would be reasonableness rather
than perfection.''32 In the field of chattels the Uniform Commercial
Code uses the test of whether or not the article will pass in trade
without objection,"3 meaning the goods must be of a comparable
quality to that generally accepted in that line of trade. 4 Either or
both of these tests would be a suitable standard, since they are flex-
ible and can be applied to individual cases with little difficulty.
A buyer should not be protected as to defects that upon exami-
nation should be discovered. This is the Code rule with respect to
chattels.3 5 The difficulty arises as to the degree of competence that
is to be the standard to which the buyer is to be held. A reasonable
suggestion has been made that the buyer be held at least to the
standard of competence and skill which he in fact possesses; other-
wise, the buyer should be held only to that knowledge that would be
gained from an inspection by a reasonable nonexpert."6
Once it has been determined that the seller is liable under an
implied warranty, the amount of damages to be awarded the buyer
must be computed. There are two logical possibilities as to what
31 Bearman, supra note 1, at 576.
32 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
33 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2)(a).
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 2.
3
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3) (b).
36 Haskell, supra note 5, at 651.
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should be used as the measure of damages: (1) Damages awarded
shall be the amount necessary to correct the defect; (2) Damages
awarded shall be the difference between the value of the property
without the defect and the value of the property with the defect. It
is submitted that if the property is capable of repair, the cost of the
repairs should be used. If the property cannot be repaired so as to
bring it back to the condition that was bargained for because of
physical impossibility or disproportionately high cost of repair, then
the second method should be used as the means of measuring dam-
ages. In this way the purchaser will be returned to the position for
which he bargained.
The application of the doctrine of implied warranty does not
bar one from also asking for relief under the traditional doctrine of
fraud or misrepresentation. It has been held that there need be no
election between the two remedies since both are based upon an af-
firmance of the contract." The significance of this holding occurs
in a jurisdiction which does not recognize the doctrine of implied
warranty. One may bring an action under both theories, thereby
allowing the court to apply the doctrine in that jurisdiction if it so
chooses; but, if the court refuses, one may still recover on the basis
of fraud, assuming sufficient proof thereof has been offered.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the trend is toward applying implied warranties
to sales of real property, and this trend is justified.38 As Professor
Jaeger states in Williston on Contracts, "it would be much better if
this enlightened approach were adopted with respect to the sale of
new houses for it would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work
and jerry-building that has become perceptible over the years."39 As
a result of the extension of the doctrine by the courts, legislation may
be required to solve some of the problems, particularly the problem
involving the statute of limitations; builders may be forced to dis-
claim warranties or include limited express warranties to limit their
potential liability; but in any event, liability may be avoided by build-




Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
38 See Bearman, supra note 1 ; Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for
a Particular Purpose, 37 MINN. L. REV. 108 (1953); Haskell, supra note 5; Note,
51CORNELL LX 389 (19466); 5 DE PAUL L. REV. 263 (1956) ; 5 ILL. BJT 08
(1963) ; 18 MD. L. REV. 332 (1958) ; 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 528 (1958) ; Note, 26 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 862 (1965) ; 34 WASH. L. REV. 171 '(1959); 4 W. RES. L. REV. 357
(1953).
39 7 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926a, at 818 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
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